Does corporate tax planning expose investors to non-diversifiable risk? In this paper, we investigate the asset pricing implications of corporate tax planning in the context of policy risk. Corporate tax planning can increase investors' non-diversifiable risk if it exposes the firm to greater risk from tax policy changes. Our results suggest that a risk premium related to tax planning exists. In the time series, its magnitude varies with political ideology, becoming stronger during periods of high Democratic influence over the White House and the United States Tax Court. In the cross-section, it varies with the firm's size, presence of foreign operations, and tax lobby activity of its industry.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate tax planning investments generate cash flows for shareholders by reducing the share of profits paid to the tax authority. These risky cash flows must then be priced. Relative to other key corporate finance decisions-capital structure and payout policy, for example-we know surprisingly little about the capital market implications of tax planning. The purpose of this paper is twofold: to motivate the conditions under which a firm's tax planning investments affect its systematic risk exposure and to provide empirical evidence on the association between tax planning and a firm's expected returns, a first-order determinant of equity values.
To motivate the potential for tax planning to affect equity risk exposure, consider the government's resemblance to a minority shareholder with a legal claim to a share of the firm's cash flows (Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 2007) . What makes this claim unique is that the sharing rule varies over time in response to changing tax policies that are jointly determined by legislation, enforcement, and judicial decisions. These policies are not stationary and difficult to predict (Bagchi 2016; Romer and Romer 2010; Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt 2009 ). Thus, every firm faces a risk that these policies will change in future periods, affecting after-tax cash flows. To the extent tax policy is not perfectly correlated with the market or macroeconomic conditions, uncertainty about tax policy can be a separate source of non-diversifiable risk (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi 2013) . Firms that engage in more intensive tax planning are more likely to participate in the types of transactions and activities affected by future tax policy moves. As a result, they are more exposed to the uncertainty of tax policies; this leads to higher systematic risk and a higher cost of equity (i.e., higher expected returns). 1 1 Throughout the paper, we use terms "expected returns" and "cost of equity" interchangeably.
To document the link between tax planning and expected returns empirically, we use tax planning measures from year t -1 to predict realized returns from July of year t through June of year t + 1. Specifically, we investigate whether shares of firms with higher tax planning on average earn higher future returns after controlling for exposure to standard asset pricing factors and other firm characteristics.
Our primary tax planning proxy is an industry-median cash-based effective tax rate-a ratio of the cumulative cash paid for income taxes over three years to cumulative pretax income over the same period. Ceteris paribus, we expect lower cash tax rates to be associated with more active tax planning. We choose the cash tax rate to provide closer comparability to prior research. When relevant, we discuss the sensitivity of our results to using the GAAP effective tax rate and booktax difference. 2 Our results provide evidence of a tax planning-induced risk premium. The average difference in returns between the equal-weighted quintile portfolios of stocks in industries with the lowest versus highest cash tax rates is about 4.1 to 6.7%, annualized. These results are supported by crosssectional regressions of monthly returns on tax rates that control for a wide range of stock characteristics including size, book-to-market, profitability, investment, leverage, and R&D intensity among others.
If exposure to a government's uncertain tax policies is the source of the observed return differences, the risk premiums should be highest when the probability of an adverse shift in tax policy is elevated. To capture this time-varying risk, we focus on the political ideology of the President and the judges of the United States Tax Court. If the ideology of a Democratic President or his judicial appointees favors a policy shift in a pro-government direction, tax policy risk premiums should be higher when Democratic influence over tax policy is stronger. Consistent with this logic, we find that risk premiums are generally higher during Democratic presidencies and in periods with more Democratic-appointed judges on the Tax Court. 3 The extent to which tax planning exposes firms to tax policy risk can also vary in the crosssection. We consider the role of firm size, industry tax lobbying and foreign operations in explaining this variation. Empirically, we find that smaller firms have higher tax planning-based premiums, perhaps because of less scope to hedge or diversify their tax strategies. Firms in industries that engage in more tax lobbying have smaller tax planning-based premiums, consistent with lobbying mitigating tax policy risk; this effect is strongest during Democratic presidencies.
Finally, the multinational firm is in the crosshairs of proposals to curtail tax planning that exploits income shifting across countries, and we find significantly higher tax-planning premiums for stocks with foreign operations during Democratic presidencies. However, the multinational-driven influence on premiums is detectable only when we use GAAP effective tax rates to measure tax planning, arguably because GAAP-based tax rates offer a cleaner identification of foreign tax rate differentials. The importance of Tax Court composition for the cross-sectional differences in premiums is less dramatic, though we find that tax planning risk premiums for small firms appear driven by the periods with Democratic-dominated Tax Courts. 3 These results are somewhat sensitive to the choice of the tax planning measure. The differences in premiums between Democratic and Republican presidencies (between periods with a high and low fraction of Democratic-appointed judges) are statistically significant only when we use GAAP tax rates or book-tax differences (cash tax rates or booktax differences) to measure tax planning.
Central to our research design is the measurement of tax planning intensity at the industry level. Our choice is driven by three main considerations. First, we require a forward-looking measure of the firm's expected exposure to tax policy risk. Firm-specific proxies display considerable mean reversion that renders a sorting on historical tax planning a weak predictor of future tax planning. Industry measures are far more persistent, reflecting long-run competitive equilibria in tax planning outcomes that arise from asset structures, operating characteristics and organizational forms typical for the firm's industry. 4 Second, industry variation in tax planning should be better aligned with variation in the priced exposure to tax policy risk. Corporate tax lobbying and IRS enforcement are often organized along industry lines. Likewise, tax incentives embedded in legislation are frequently industry-specific.
Overall, industry membership determines the uncertainty about a particular set of tax policies. As a result, the cash flow effects of changing tax policies lead to shocks that are correlated across firms in the same industry, but vary across industries. By focusing on cross-industry variation we increase the power of our tests to detect the tax policy risk premium.
Finally, measuring tax planning at the industry level allows us to differentiate between the risk and mispricing explanations for return predictability. Prior research finds that firms with higher tax expense (relative to book income) experience higher future earnings growth and stock returns (Chi, Pincus, and Teoh 2014; Lev and Nissim 2004; Thomas and Zhang 2011; Weber 2009 ). These 4 Using industry tax rates also mitigates measurement error in the firm-level estimates. See, for example, Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) and Henry and Sansing (2014) . Problems attributed to firm-specific measures of tax planning include: a) bias caused by dropping or eliminating firms with negative pretax income, b) the impact of idiosyncratic accounting shocks in the measurement of earnings, c) the need for a long time series of data to calculate long-run cash tax rate measures, d) the relatively short time series of data on unrecognized tax benefits, e) lack of observability due to incentives for opaque disclosures, f) correlations between tax proxies and shocks to economic performance. By using industry measures, we are also not forced to drop the roughly one-third of observations lost through the requirement of historical firm profitability to estimate expected tax rates or book-tax differences. Loss firms are included in our sample, though our results are robust to excluding them. associations have been interpreted as evidence of mispricing and subsequent price correction due to the market's failure to fully incorporate information about future profitability contained in taxable income.
We observe similar patterns associated with firm-specific tax-planning measures in our sample. Higher firm-level cash tax rates are associated with both higher profitability growth and higher future returns. Furthermore, the positive association between firm-level tax rates and future returns becomes insignificant once we control for future profitability growth, a result consistent with mispricing. In contrast, industry tax rates are largely uncorrelated with future profitability changes and the negative association between industry tax rates and future returns remains statistically significant after controlling for future changes in firms' profitability. Hence, future returns associated with industry-level tax rates should be less contaminated by the apparent mispricing of tax expense information and thus better reflect systematic risk exposure.
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We are not the first to document an association between tax planning and the cost of capital. Similar to our findings, Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2014) and Shevlin, Urcan, and Vasvari (2013) show that more tax planning is associated with a higher cost of debt. In sharp contrast to our findings, Goh, Lee, Lim, and Shevlin (2016) find that firms with high tax planning, measured at the firm level, have a lower implied cost of capital, a result they attribute to positive cash flow effects of tax avoidance.
Our study differs from Goh et al. (2016) in several respects. Conceptually, we propose a direct link between tax planning intensity and systematic risk based on the co-movement in cash flows driven by uncertainty in tax policy. Empirically, we use ex-post realized returns to proxy for the cost of equity and industry tax rates to proxy for tax planning intensity. Our results are not driven by the measure of expected returns-we find similar results when we replace realized returns with the implied cost of capital measure from Goh et al. (2016) . It is also unlikely driven by the differences in sample composition or other research design choices-we are able to replicate the main result in Goh et al.-a positive association between the implied cost of capital and firm-level cash tax rates-in our sample. Hence, the difference appears driven by our decision to measure tax planning at the industry level.
The sensitivity of the results to the measurement of tax planning intensity at firm versus industry levels is also consistent with tax planning having two opposite effects on firms' risk exposure, with one of the effects dominating in some settings. Consistent with Goh et al. (2016) , tax planning may reduce a firm's risk by generating positive net cash flows that are less volatile than the cash flows from the firm's core operations. 6 In contrast, tax planning strategies that expose the firm to more uncertainty about future tax policies increase investors' systematic risk. The focus on the latter effect is novel to our paper. Further investigation into the features of firms' tax planning activities that influence firms' exposure to tax policy risks is likely to be a fruitful avenue for future research.
Growing evidence suggests that exposure to government policy risk is an important determinant of stock returns (Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and Molchanaov 2012; Croce, Kung, Nguyen, and Schmid 2012; Pastor and Veronesi 2013) . Our research contributes to this body of evidence by focusing on taxation-a key element of fiscal policy. Our study also contributes to a 6 More broadly, the difference in results between firm-and industry-level tax planning measures may also be driven by measurement issues. Our results suggest that a positive association between firm-level cash tax rates and future realized returns is likely driven by mispricing. The implied cost of equity measures may be likewise contaminated by mispricing, errors in analysts' forecasts, or issues with model assumptions, all of which might be alleviated by industry-averaging. We leave it to future research to pursue these possibilities.
literature on the economic consequences of tax planning. Remarks by the IRS, law firms, governance advisors, and accounting firms point to the increasing importance of managing tax risk. 7 Our finding that investors associate more intensive tax planning with higher exposure to systematic risk contributes to our understanding of the determinants of a firm's discount rate, and by extension, the types of corporate strategies that maximize the firm's value. Finally, understanding the risk consequences of tax planning is crucial for the efficient design of incentives and organizational structures that exploit value-enhancing opportunities for tax planning. Hence, our findings relate to the literature on the role of agency conflicts in tax planning and the broader discussion of tax risk management occurring in the boardroom.
TAX PLANNING AND RISK
Tax planning reflects efforts by managers to structure the organization and its investments, transactions, and reporting to exploit tax-based opportunities to increase firm value. 8 These opportunities arise from investments that are tax-favored, transactions that exploit ambiguity in the tax law to reduce marginal tax costs, and discretion over the location, timing, and characterization of reported income and deductions in the tax returns. Of course, managers not only respond to tax law, they actively attempt to influence future tax laws through lobby activity as shown by Gupta and Swenson (2003) and others.
The impact of corporate tax planning on security values depends on how tax planning affects after-tax cash flows and the discount rate. 9 In a typical valuation model, the numerator picks up the effect of tax planning on expected cash flows (cash tax savings less the costs of defending the position, accounting and audit costs, restructuring costs and agency costs). 10 The discount rate in the denominator picks up the effect of tax planning on investors' exposure to non-diversifiable risk.
The idea that tax planning has implications for the risk profile of the firm is not new.
Practitioner commentary on tax management and corporate governance points to the increasing prominence of tax risk considerations in corporate decision making and control (Levin, Petrini, Smith, and White 2006; Larsen 2011; Ernst & Young 2014 investors should also demand a risk premium associated with the expected exposure, increasing the firm's cost of equity. To the extent these premiums are more than negligible, they should be detectable in firms' stock returns.
To motivate our inquiry, we turn to an emerging literature in financial economics addressing the link between policy uncertainty and stock returns (e.g., Boutchkova et al. 2012; Croce et al. 2012; Pastor and Veronesi 2013; Brogaard and Detzel 2015) . In Pastor and Veronesi (2013) , for to draw concrete inferences about the relation between tax planning and value (Desai and Hines 2002; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock 2014) . 10 These net cash flow benefits clearly exist but can be challenging to document since the costs of tax planning primarily affect earnings before tax while the benefits of tax planning are difficult to infer given the limited disclosure required by financial reporting rules. See Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for a review of the recent literature.
example, policy uncertainty represents a separate source of non-diversifiable risk when future policy choices affect firm cash flows independent of broader economic conditions and when there is uncertainty about the impact of current policies on cash flows. They provide empirical evidence suggesting that periods of greater policy uncertainty are associated with stronger correlations in stock returns, higher risk premiums, and premiums that increase in weak economic conditions.
In this paper, we focus on tax policy-a cornerstone of a government's fiscal policies. The risks that derive from tax policy uncertainty come from at least three sources: tax legislation, enforcement, and judicial decisions.
Legislation
Analyzing several decades of tax legislation, Romer and Romer (2010) conclude that tax policy is largely motivated by attempts to encourage and stimulate long-term growth. However, the outcome of the political process surrounding tax legislation is subject to significant uncertainty.
This uncertainty is recognized by firms that engage in extensive tax lobbying to influence legislative outcomes. 11 The legislative side of tax policy is also inextricably linked to the enforcement side. Although Congress writes the tax law that goes to the President's desk for signature, it is the regulator-the Department of Treasury-that writes the specific regulations to implement the legislation. Uncertainty about future tax legislation is a key component of the economic policy uncertainty index proposed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) . To the extent that tax legislation decisions do not correlate perfectly with macroeconomic conditions, tax legislation uncertainty may be one source of non-diversifiable risk.
11 The relative amount of resources dedicated to lobbying on tax issues is impressive: taxation is consistently on par with issues such as health and defense in terms of the number of lobbyists and clients participating in the process (see www.opensecrets.org).
In 
Judiciary
The court is a key venue for setting tax policy. Although the case usually involves just a single taxpayer, the court's decision establishes a legal precedent that can have direct implications for a broader range of firms engaged in similar activities. Thus, uncertainty about judicial opinions on tax planning strategies can also affect investor perceptions of tax policy risk. For example, judicial attitude toward tax planning intensity appears to vary over time, perhaps due to political forces. Staudt, Epstein, and Wiedenbeck (2006) find that the ideology of the Supreme Court (liberal vs.
conservative) affects the likelihood of a pro-government ruling. More liberal courts are more likely to rule against corporate taxpayers, but are no different in their rulings against individual taxpayers.
Also, the composition of judges in any given court varies through time and the appointment of a judge to most federal courts-including the Tax Court-is made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. In this paper, we consider time series variation in the composition of the U.S. Tax Court, the venue where most challenges to corporate tax planning are decided.
RELATED RESEARCH
Several recent studies suggest that tax planning and risk are linked through indirect channels.
If aggressive tax planning is associated with greater asymmetric information, as in Desai and Dharmapala (2006) , and if asymmetric information is associated with priced risk, then greater tax planning will increase the cost of capital. In debt markets, Hasan et al. (2014) and Shevlin et al. (2013) show that firms that avoid more tax incur higher costs of debt. They interpret these results as an outcome of high tax planning firms having lower information quality and amplified agency problems.
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Our study is also related to Goh et al. (2016) who suggest that, depending on the magnitude of additional cash flows created by tax management relative to additional volatility imposed through tax planning and information asymmetry, more intense tax planning can lead to either higher or lower expected returns. In contrast to the studies on debt pricing, they find that high tax planning firms have lower implied cost of capital, and attribute the effect to equity investors' demand for a lower rate of return "due to the positive cash flow effects of corporate governance," (p. 30). 13 In this paper, we focus on a fundamentally different and more direct conceptual interpretation:
whether tax planning creates a policy-driven risk that investors are unable to diversify.
Empirically, we predict an association between tax planning intensity and expected returns that runs in the opposite direction of Goh et al. (2016) .
Our paper departs from Goh et al. (2016) and other prior work by providing a simple and more direct theoretical link between corporate tax planning and priced risk based on the proposition that firms face correlated exposures to tax policy-based shocks. 14 In contrast, the existing literature leans heavily on assumed links between tax planning, information quality, and the pricing of information risk. In addition, we adopt an industry approach to measure tax planning, both to avoid problems with firm-level estimates (selection biases from dropping loss firms, measurement errors and the mispricing of tax expense) and to exploit industry commonality in organizational structures and investment opportunity sets. 15 Further, the centrality of industry to tax policy activities such as lobbying, enforcement, and legislation supports our view that industry-driven tax planning intensity is best suited to capture firm's exposure to tax policy uncertainty. 16 We devote a later section to a discussion of our results and inferences as they relate to Goh et al. (2016) .
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

Sample and variable definitions
The sample consists of all U.S. firms traded on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq with at least three 
Tax planning measures
Our setting requires a measure of exposure to future government actions that affect the payoffs to present and future tax planning strategies. Prior research provides little guidance on which tax planning proxies best capture such risk. The cash effective tax rate is often adopted based on the argument that it should reflect all tax-planning strategies, including those missed by accrual-based measures. In untabulated tests, however, we find that the accruals-based GAAP effective tax rate appears most adept at explaining future both future settlements with the tax authority and interest and penalties on underpayment of tax-proxies for exposure to enforcement activities. To maximize comparability to existing research, we present our results using cash-based effective tax rates. However, we also replicate our primary tests using the GAAP effective tax rate and a third frequently employed tax planning proxy, the book-tax difference (the difference between book income and estimated taxable income).
We construct all measures of tax planning at the industry level. The industry cash effective tax rate is the median three-year cash effective tax rate of those firms with positive pretax income before special items. We measure it as the sum of total cash paid for taxes over the three-year period ending in year t -1 divided by the sum of pretax income before special items over the same period. 17 The GAAP effective tax rate is defined similarly except that we replace cash taxes paid with total tax expense in the numerator. We omit tax rates below zero and above one when estimating industry medians. The book-tax difference is the three-year median difference between pretax income before special items and an estimate of taxable income (current tax expense / 0.35), scaled by the three-year average of total assets and is computed using firms with usable effective tax rates. In empirical tests, we use the negative of the industry book-tax difference to provide directional comparability with the tax rate measures. Industry definitions are from the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.
As discussed in the introduction, industry-level measures are attractive because they allow us to address the mispricing interpretation, are consistent with the organization of tax planning and enforcement by industry, are more likely to capture variation in systematic risk exposure and are more representative of the forward-looking tax planning that is relevant for asset pricing. In Table   1 , we provide evidence on the latter point, the persistence of firm and industry level measures of tax planning. Each year, we sort stocks into quintiles based on the three-year cash tax rates measured at the firm or industry level. We then tabulate the average future tax rate for each of these portfolios for three or six years following the sorts. As expected, firm-specific tax rates are strongly mean reverting. Firms in the lowest quintile of three-year effective tax rates today show an 11 percentage point increase, nearly tripling their average tax rate in the following three years.
The firms in the highest quintile fall by an average of fifteen percentage points. The spread in average tax rates between the firms with the highest and lowest cash tax rate falls from 43% to only 17% in the following three years. Industry rates also mean revert, but to a significantly lesser degree; the spread in average industry tax rates across portfolios falls from 14% to 10% within three years. At six years, the spread continues to drop using firm-specific rates but remains relatively stable for industry-level rates. Similar patterns exist for the GAAP effective tax rate and the book-tax difference and when using industry-adjusted firm-specific rates. We rely on industry rates for the bulk of our empirical analyses, but return to a comparison between industry-and firmlevel measures when comparing our results to Goh et al. (2016) .
Stock characteristics
In cross-sectional asset pricing regressions, we include two groups of control variables. First, we control for common characteristics associated with stock returns including the firm's market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, prior returns and leverage. Following Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) and Fama and French (2015) we also include stock characteristics underlying two additional risk factors, profitability measured as earnings before taxes divided by book equity, and net investment measured as the percentage change in total assets from the prior year. Second, we include controls associated with incentives and opportunities for tax planning, including net property, plant, and equipment (PPE), balance sheet intangibles, and R&D and advertising expenses all scaled by lagged assets (Dyreng et al. (2008) ). We also include an indicator variable equal to one when the firm reports foreign pretax earnings to control for multinational tax planning opportunities. Finally, we include a proxy for industry tax lobby intensity in regressions that investigate the cross-sectional variation in the risk consequences of tax planning. We measure tax lobby intensity as a fraction of all firms in the industry that is involved in tax lobbying. The tax lobby data is from Brown, Drake, and Wellman (2015) . Details pertaining to control variable measurement are described in the Appendix. All firm characteristics measured as continuous variables are winsorized yearly at 1% and 99% of their distributions. Table 2 reports average characteristics for portfolios sorted on tax planning intensity. Firms are assigned to quintile portfolios at the end of each June based on their industry cash tax rates from the prior year. For most characteristics, the sorting produces patterns consistent with prior literature on the determinants of tax planning and with general intuition. Firms in low tax rate industries are on average larger and thus have greater resources available for tax planning. They are also less levered due to lower tax benefits of debt associated with lower tax rates. These firms have higher R&D activity that allows them to benefit from tax credits and generate assets with income streams that are more easily shifted to lower-taxed jurisdictions. Moreover, their industries are more likely to engage in tax lobby activity. Although less profitable, firms in low tax rate industries have greater investment growth, higher market-to-book ratios, and higher prior stock returns. Finally, these firms have higher uncertain tax benefit accruals, reflecting the riskiness of their tax positions.
Descriptive statistics
18 Surprisingly, there is no obvious association between cash tax rates and foreign activity, though untabulated results indicate stronger differences in GAAP effective tax rates consistent with the accrual-based measure better reflecting foreign tax rate variation.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Nonparametric tests: Returns on portfolios sorted by tax planning intensity
In this section, we examine the returns on portfolios formed on the industry cash tax rate.
Unlike asset pricing regressions estimated in the next section, portfolio sorting does not specify the exact functional form of the relation between returns and tax planning proxies. It relies only on information available in real time and approximates an implementable trading strategy. We assign stocks to quintile portfolios at the end of June in year t based on the tax planning measure in year t -1. This timing ensures that public information about tax planning activity is impounded in price prior to the measurement of stock returns. We rebalance the portfolios monthly to incorporate stock delistings. When a stock delists, we include the delisting return in the portfolio return calculation. We substitute missing delisting returns with average delisting returns following Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999) . Table 3 reports average returns and summary statistics for portfolios sorted on tax planning.
We estimate returns in excess of the risk-free rate as well as portfolio alphas. The three-factor model (Fama and French 1993) includes the market, size and book-to-market factors. The fourfactor model adds momentum to the three-factor model (Carhart 1997) , while the five-factor model adds investment and profitability factors (Fama and French 2015) . We obtain all factor series from Kenneth French's website. The last column contains returns on the hedge portfolio that is long (short) in the quintile of stocks with low (high) tax rates.
Reported in Panel A of Table 3 , the three-, four-, and five-factor alphas on the hedge portfolios are statistically significant. The average hedge portfolio alpha from the three-factor model amounts to 35 basis points per month (4.2% annually) (t = 2.11), while the average alpha from the fivefactor model amounts to 56 basis points per month (6.7% annually) (t = 3.37).
The monthly Sharpe ratio of the hedge portfolio reported in Panel B of Table 3 is equal to 0.09, which is lower than the Sharpe ratios of the market portfolio (0.15) and momentum factor (0.13), but higher than the Sharpe ratios of SMB (0.04) and HML (0.08) factors over the same period. The monthly Sharpe ratio of the highest tax planning (lowest tax rate) portfolio is 0.14, which is higher than the Sharpe ratio of the hedge portfolio, suggesting that the lowest tax rate portfolio may in fact better track tax policy risk.
Even absent the policy risk we are interested in, tax planning may affect return volatility and exposure to conventional risk factors. When the firm engages in tax planning, it trades variable income tax costs for a new set of costs that may not vary with economic performance (Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) ). This generates the equivalent of leveraged cash flows that increases the volatility of after-tax cash flows to investors (Lev 1974; Novy-Marx 2011) . It can also increase the covariance of after-tax income with market performance, which should manifest in higher betas. Panel B of Table 3 reports return volatility and factor loadings for portfolios sorted on the tax planning measure. Portfolios with greater tax planning intensity (i.e., lower cash tax rates) have higher return volatility. Moreover, the market beta for the highest tax planning firms is about 10% larger than that for the lowest tax planning firms (1.09 vs. 0.99, t = 2.40), providing some evidence that tax planning is also priced through a simple operating leverage channel.
Overall, our results are consistent with a risk premium related to tax planning, although the evidence is not overwhelmingly strong. In the next section, we examine the time-series variation in tax planning premiums to provide additional evidence on whether tax planning represents a unique source of risk, and include additional controls for characteristics likely to affect both tax planning and stock returns.
Asset pricing regressions
Simple portfolio sorts provide some evidence of a tax-planning based risk premium. However, the descriptive statistics suggest that tax planning intensity is correlated with multiple firm characteristics that may, on their own, be associated with a firm's systematic risk. To test whether tax planning intensity predicts stock returns after controlling for such characteristics, we employ cross-sectional regressions (Fama and MacBeth 1973) throughout the remainder of the paper.
In Table 4 we report average coefficients from monthly cross-sectional regressions of individual stock returns on stock characteristics as well as the t-statistics corresponding to the timeseries distribution of the estimated regression coefficients. The first four columns report the results for the full sample period using an increasingly rich set of control variables. For all specifications, we find that cash tax rate has a statistically significant negative association with returns after controlling for other firm characteristics. For the model with a full set of controls reported in column (4) reducing the effective tax rate by ten percentage points (from 35% to 25%) is associated with a 3.4% higher stock return (annualized) (-2.86 coefficient in column (4) x 0.1 effective tax rate change x 12 months). Thus, firms with a higher expected intensity of tax planning appear to have significantly higher expected returns, consistent with tax planning inducing a risk that investors require compensation to bear.
Time-series variation in risk premiums
Tax planning-induced systematic risk can vary over time. For example, there is a significant increase in the proportion of IRS resources devoted to criminal investigations and in the number of corporate tax audits during Democratic presidential administrations (Bagchi (2016) ). If
Democratic administrations are perceived by the market as more determined to curtail tax planning (through legislated tax policy, appointments to the Treasury Department, enforcement budgets and mandates and so on), then firms that engage in more intensive tax planning should be more exposed to policy risk during those administrations.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 Columns (7) and (8) of Table 4 report average coefficients from monthly cross-sectional regressions estimated separately for the months in which the proportion of Democratic appointees to the Tax Court was high or low. The premiums associated with tax planning are statistically significant only when the percentage of Democratic appointees is high. A ten percentage point reduction in the cash tax rate is associated with a 51 basis points per month (6.12% annually)
higher return during the periods when Democratic appointees make up a larger fraction of the Tax Court (t = -3.16) and a statistically insignificant change in returns when they do not.
In Table 5 , we replace the cash tax rate with the GAAP effective tax rate and the book-tax difference. The controls from column (4) of Table 4 are included in the regression but not tabulated for brevity. In column (1) of panels A and B, sorts on tax planning using the GAAP effective tax rate and book-tax difference predict higher returns for higher tax planning firms, however, only the book-tax association is significant. Unlike the cash tax rates sorts, however, high tax planning firms measured using both the GAAP effective tax rate and the book-tax difference have significantly higher returns only during Democratic presidencies (columns 2 and 3). GAAP tax rates do not explain returns across Tax Court regimes, but similar to cash tax rates, book-tax differences do (columns 4 and 5), suggesting significantly higher returns to high tax planning firms when the Tax Court is dominated by Democratic appointees.
Overall, the returns to stocks with more intensive tax planning appear statistically and economically higher than their low tax planning counterparts, even after controlling for other characteristics associated with tax planning. The strength of the association varies across the tax planning proxies used and over time, with generally higher premiums observed during periods when the expected benefits of tax planning are more uncertain because of an elevated risk of tax policy changes.
Cross-sectional variation in risk premiums
In this section, we investigate whether the association between tax planning and systematic risk depends on firm and industry characteristics.
Tax lobbying.
On one hand, firms can hedge against tax policy changes by investing in political influence through tax lobbying. On the other, tax lobbying itself should depend on the uncertainty of tax legislation; firms that benefit from tax provisions with high certainty are less likely to invest in lobbying to protect those incentives. To capture the intensity of industry tax lobbying, we use the number of firms involved in tax lobbying by industry from Brown, Drake, and Wellman (2015) scaled by the total number of firms in the industry.
Firm size and foreign operations.
The relation between firm size and tax policy risk is also ambiguous. On one hand, small firms lack the scale and complexity of large firms. With less diversified tax strategies, they have more exposure to adverse consequences of future government tax policies. Unlike their larger counterparts, they may also be less willing to invest in political influence to protect their strategies, further increasing their exposure to policy changes. On the other hand, large firms are more likely to be multinational and have incentives to exploit tax-reducing transactions that shift income across tax jurisdictions-strategies at the forefront of the debate on corporate tax planning activity (e.g.,
U.S. Senate 2014)
. This can expose larger firms to more tax policy risk.
In a similar vein, a firm with foreign operations has more tax planning opportunities through income shifting than a purely domestic firm. However, multinational firms are exposed to tax policy uncertainty in every country and many times face foreign tax rates that are higher than their US tax rate. For these reasons, we make no signed predictions on the effects of size and foreign operations on the exposure to tax policy risk.
19 Table 6 reports the results from monthly cross-sectional regressions that include interaction terms between the cash effective tax rate and tax lobby intensity, firm size and foreign operations.
The first column reports results for the full sample period, while columns (2) through (5) contain regressions estimated separately for the months with Democratic or Republican presidential administrations and high versus low proportion of Tax Court judges appointed by a Democratic president. The results suggest significant interactions with industry tax lobby intensity and firm 19 In additional (untabulated) tests, we considered the variation in the tax planning-return relation across research and development (R&D) activity. R&D expenditures are tax deductible and can generate additional tax credits, giving managers incentives to put the R&D label on corporate expenses to reduce tax liabilities. Furthermore, the assets generated by firms with high R&D intensity are more mobile and thus facilitate shifting taxable income to lower-tax jurisdictions. On the other hand, R&D tax incentives are in place precisely because of the desire to stimulate real and risky investment. Thus, it may be a less risky form of tax rate reduction than an aggressive transfer pricing strategy designed strictly to reduce taxes without affecting real activity. In general, we find no evidence that the association between tax planning and returns varies with the extent of R&D activity.
size. The sensitivity of stock returns to tax planning is significantly stronger for smaller firms (t =
2.45). The small firm effect is strongest in months when a Democratic President is in office or
when Democratic influence over the Tax Court is high. The association between the tax planning measure and stock returns appears mitigated by greater industry tax lobbying (t = 1.88). The mitigating impact of tax lobby activity is only present when a Democrat is in the White House and does not depend on Tax Court influence. This result is not surprising if the marginal lobby dollar is directed toward legislative and enforcement influence rather than judicial influence.
In Table 7 , we provide the results for the interactions between the GAAP tax rate and booktax differences and firm size, foreign operations and lobby activity. Interactions between these alternative tax planning proxies and size yield results that are similar to those based on cash tax rates. Specifically, for both the GAAP effective tax rate in Panel A, and the book-tax difference in Overall, while the results are not always uniform, some common themes emerge. First, while tax planning is priced across the entire sample, small firms face the most exposure to tax planning risk, and their tax-planning risk premiums are higher in periods when Democrats have more influence over tax policy. Second, industry tax lobby activities are effective at breaking the link between tax planning and risk exposure; that moderating effect is present only during Democratic administrations and does not vary in strength depending on the degree of Democratic influence over the Tax Court. Finally, there is some evidence that foreign operations expose investors to greater tax policy risk, but this effect is present only during Democratic presidencies and only when we employ GAAP effective tax rates-arguably a cleaner measure of foreign tax planning intensity.
Additional analyses
Risk or Mispricing?
Prior research finds that firms with higher tax expenses experience higher earnings growth and stock returns in the future (Chi et al. 2014; Lev and Nissim 2004; Thomas and Zhang 2011; Weber 2009 ). This return predictability is often interpreted as evidence of mispricing due to the market's failure to incorporate information about future profitability contained in taxable income. 20 The mispricing suggested by prior research implies that firms with low tax rates should have lower returns, which biases against our hypothesized positive association between tax planning intensity and expected returns. 21 A residual concern is that industries with low tax rates also benefit more 20 Prior research also suggests explanations other than mispricing for these empirical patterns (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) . 21 Alternatively, suppose investors systematically underweight the cash savings from tax planning. This will cause high tax planning firms to have higher future returns as future cash flow realizations surprise investors. This could happen, for example, if investors are misled by a manager's decision to "over-reserve" for expected settlements with the tax authority. Such mispricing, however, implies that the returns to an investment strategy that is long in high-tax planning firms and short in low-tax planning firms will earn excess positive returns in years when tax policy is more likely to be pro-taxpayer and negative in years when tax policy is more likely to be pro-government. We find the opposite pattern-hedge returns on a portfolio that is long (short) in stocks with low (high) effective tax rate are more positive during the Democratic presidential administrations and in the periods with a higher proportion of Democraticappointees to the Tax Court. from government expenditure policies (i.e. a greater proportion of their output is purchased by the government). Belo, Gala, and Li (2013) show that firms in such industries earn higher returns in the periods when a Democrat holds the presidency, a finding that they attribute to stock market under-reaction.
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To empirically alleviate the concern that our results are driven by the market not fully incorporating signals about future profitability conveyed by firm-or industry-level tax rates, we first examine how the trends in future profitability vary with tax planning measures. Panel A of Table 8 reports average changes in profitability between year t and years t + 1, t + 2, and t + 3 for firms sorted into quintile portfolios based on cash tax rates measured in year t. We measure profitability as either return on assets (ROA)-earnings before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets-or earnings-to-price ratios (E/P)-earnings before extraordinary items scaled by lagged market value of equity. Portfolios in the top (bottom) of the panel are formed based on firm-level (industry-level) cash tax rates. Sorting based on firm-level tax rates in the top half of Panel A produces results consistent with prior research such as Lev and Nissim (2004) and Weber (2009) . 23 Specifically, an increase in the firm-level cash tax rate (high taxable income or tax expense relative to book income) is associated with greater profitability growth over the following three years. However, when we turn to sorts on industry tax rates in the bottom half of the panel, we find quite different results. Profitability growth in high tax rate industries is marginally lower than or similar to firms in industries with lower tax rates. In untabulated results, we regress future earnings growth on both firm-and 22 At the firm level, Mills, Nutter, and Schwab (2013) report that firms with more exposure to government contracts also report higher effective tax rates. It is not clear whether industry measures display similar patterns. 23 Across all portfolios, average profitability growth is negative. This is not surprising as the use of firm-level rates force us to drop firms with losses and thus select on the subsample of firms with the highest profitability in year t.
industry-level tax rates and find consistent evidence that increasing the tax at the firm level predicts future earnings growth while increasing tax at the industry level does not. Our results suggest that industry-level measures are less susceptible to the confounded inferences that arise when firmlevel ratios of or differences between tax and book income proxies (including the effective tax rate and book-tax difference) predict future earnings growth and stock returns.
To offer a direct test of the mispricing explanation for our results, we re-estimate FamaMacBeth regressions of realized returns on tax planning proxies and include future profitability changes as an additional control. To the extent that potential mispricing is driven by the market not fully impounding all available information about future profitability changes into the stock price, including the future change in ROA or the E/P ratio should control for the returns associated with a mispricing correction.
Panel B of Table 8 reports the results. The regressions in columns (1) - (3) use firm-specific cash tax rates. Before controlling for future profitability, the coefficient on firm-specific tax rate in column (1) is positive and statistically significant. The sign is consistent both with the implied cost of capital results in Goh et al. (2016) and with studies such as Lev and Nissim (2004) and Thomas and Zhang (2011) that suggest tax information is mispriced. However, once we control for future profitability growth in columns (2) and (3), the coefficient on firm-level tax rate turns insignificant. This re-affirms the mispricing explanation for a positive association between firmspecific cash tax rates and future realized returns.
In columns (4) -(6) of Panel B of Table 8 , we report the regressions using industry-level cash tax rates. Unlike the results in Table 4 which are based on all firms, these regressions are based only on the sample of firms with positive pretax income and tax rates between 0 and 1 to maintain comparability with the results in columns (1) -(3). This additional data requirement does not alter our main finding-we continue to find a positive and statistically significant tax-planning premium, as evidenced by the statistically significant negative coefficient on industry cash tax rate in column (4). The tax-planning premium remains similar in both magnitude and statistical significance after controlling for future profitability changes in columns (5) and (6). Overall, it appears unlikely that our results reflect mispricing associated with the market's misinterpretation of tax disclosures.
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Reconciling with Goh et al. (2016)
In sharp contrast to our findings, Goh et al. (2016) find that firms with high tax planning, measured at the firm level, have a lower implied cost of capital. They attribute this result to positive cash flow effects of tax avoidance. Our study differs from Goh et al. in terms of both underlying theory and empirical design. Conceptually, we propose a direct link between tax planning intensity and systematic risk based on the co-movement in cash flows driven by uncertainty in tax policy.
Empirically, we use ex-post realized returns to proxy for the cost of equity, whereas Goh et al. use implied cost of equity. We use industry cash tax rates to proxy for the variation in tax planning intensity linked to policy risk, whereas Goh et al. use firm-specific cash tax rates and book-tax differences.
We perform additional analyses to pinpoint the source of differences in the results and inferences between our paper and Goh et al. Specifically, we replicate our analyses with Easton's (2004) PEG measure of the implied cost of equity used by Goh et al. The PEG estimate is the square root of the ratio of the difference between two-and one-year-ahead earnings forecasts to 24 We find similar results when we measure earnings surprise as a difference between the realized earnings before extraordinary items and expected earnings. The difference is scaled by the beginning-of-the-month market value of equity. Expected earnings are derived by combining previous-year earnings with an intercept and a slope from the cross-sectional AR(1) model estimated over the past year (see Ogneva 2012 for a similar estimation). stock price. We use I/B/E/S median sell-side analysts' consensus forecasts available at the end of June in the numerator and end-of-June stock price in the denominator of the ratio. We use the estimated PEG measure as a dependent variable in the annual cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions specified in column (4) of Table 4 . Our results (untabulated) suggest that the implied cost of capital is positively associated with firm-specific cash tax rates, replicating the Goh et al.
result. 25 At the same time, the implied cost of capital is negatively associated with industry-level cash tax rates, thus replicating our main result based on realized returns. Overall, the difference between our results and Goh et al. does not appear to be caused by differences in expected return proxies (or any other differences in research design or sample composition). Instead, our results differ from Goh et al. due to our focus on across-industry variation in tax planning.
There are at least two reasons for why the sign of the association between tax planning intensity and cost of equity switches depending on the level at which tax planning is measured. However, if a firm expects to engage in tax planning activity that exposes it to more uncertainty about future tax policies, and that exposure is linked to the firm's industry, then systematic risk is likely to rise. Second, the difference in results could be driven by measurement errors. Consistent with the evidence in earlier research, our results suggest that a positive association between firmlevel cash tax rates and future realized returns is likely due to mispricing. By extension, the implied 25 In contrast, Dhaliwal, Heitzman, and Li (2006) show that implied cost of capital measures are decreasing in Graham's firm-specific marginal tax rates. However, marginal tax rates estimates are not designed to capture variation in tax planning intensity (e.g. through income shifting to foreign affiliates). Rather, they focus on the likelihood that the marginal dollar of income is subject to tax.
cost of equity measures could also be contaminated by mispricing, errors in analysts' forecasts, or issues with model assumptions.
Robustness
In additional tests aimed at differentiating between risk and mispricing explanations for our results, we examine the association between stock returns and lagged tax planning proxies. In the mispricing-correction scenario, tax planning should not explain returns after we allow more time to pass before forming the portfolios. In untabulated tests, we find that the premiums to tax planning remain statistically significant if we require additional twelve months to pass between measuring tax planning intensity and return accumulation.
Our primary tests are based on monthly cross sectional OLS regressions that allow us to control for a wider range of factors plausibly associated with both stock returns and effective tax rates. In Table 3 , we document alphas generated on portfolios formed using cash tax rates. The portfolio approach to estimating excess returns is commonly employed in empirical asset pricing. Its main advantage relative to regressions is that it avoids parametric premium estimation and mimics executable trading strategies. In untabulated sensitivity tests, we find similar results for portfolios formed on the GAAP effective tax rates and the book-tax differences.
Caveats
This study sheds light on the economic tradeoffs faced in developing and implementing a firm's tax strategy, but important caveats remain. First, empirical research (and often enforcement efforts) suffers from a lack of detailed information about the firm's tax planning; the complexity of the tax planning function and the aggregated nature of its disclosure in the financial statements can yield only limited insight. For example, even proprietary data from IRS tax returns is deficient as it ignores the bulk of foreign operations, among other things. Second, we lack a well-accepted theory on the political economy of tax legislation, enforcement, and judicial interpretation. We have limited knowledge of how tax policies respond to economic conditions and whether they affect firms differently depending on firms' stance against the tax authority. As a result, the theoretical predictions behind the tax policy risk are largely ad hoc. If tax planning risks are driven by enforcement outcomes that are largely idiosyncratic and diversifiable, there should be no premium associated with tax policy risk. Even if a policy-based risk premium does exist, it may be too small to detect. Third, we lack a robust and well-accepted theory on the definition and measurement of tax planning risk, in part due to its correlation with business risk and the interdependence of tax strategies. Finally, Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2015) suggest a t-statistic cutoff for statistical significance closer to 3.0 to account for the long history of risk factor tests, which would yield more limited support for a risk premium rooted in tax planning decisions.
CONCLUSION
This study tackles a question of growing interest in political, practitioner and academic circles:
the capital market implications of tax planning intensity. We focus on the potential for tax planning to increase investors' exposure to priced risk. While tax planning likely increases cash flow volatility, whether it has any effect on expected returns and the valuation of tax planning
investments is an open question. Tax legislation, tax enforcement efforts, and judicial decisions on tax issues vary over time and in ways that depend on political ideology. The very nature of setting government policy implies that changes, when they happen, will affect numerous firms. For the tax planning decision to increase priced risk, it must be the case that it exposes the firm to greater risk of tax policy changes that disproportionately affect high tax planning firms.
The results in this paper provide some support for a tax planning-based risk premium in stock returns. Risk premiums to tax planning intensity are concentrated in periods of Democratic presidencies and Democratic appointee-dominated Tax Courts, confirming that policymakers' ideologies influence perceptions of tax planning risk in the market. Cross-sectional factors, including tax lobby intensity, firm size and foreign operations are also important in explaining the sensitivity of stock returns to tax planning, particularly in periods of Democratic influence on tax policy. Our evidence is broadly consistent with recent findings that fiscal policy uncertainty is priced, in particular among firms with more exposure to the consequences of a change in fiscal policy. The potential for economically significant tax planning-based risk is an item of growing importance on the agendas of corporate decision makers, monitors and regulators. The evidence documented in this paper suggests that, although boards and managers should primarily focus on the expected incremental cash flows from tax planning, under certain circumstances they should also consider the potential for an impact on the discount rate.
Industry classification follows Fama and French [1997] definition of 48 industries.
Variable Definition Cash tax rate the median three-year cash tax rate in the firm's industry, where each firm's rate is the sum of taxes paid over three years divided by the sum of pretax income before special items Effective tax rate (GAAP) the median three-year effective tax rate in the firm's industry, where each firm's rate is the sum of total tax expense over three years divided by the sum of pretax income before special items - [Book -tax] the negative of industry-median book-tax difference, with medians computed over the same firms as effective and cash tax rates; each firm's book-tax difference is a three-year average difference between pretax income before special items and grossed-up (divided by 0.35) current tax expense, scaled by three-year average total assets Assets total book assets, in year 1984 billions of dollars MVE market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year, in year 1984 billions of dollars BM the book value of equity (shareholders' equity less book value of preferred stock plus deferred taxes) divided by the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year OP operating profit, defined as revenues minus cost of goods sold, minus selling, general, and administrative expenses, minus interest expense all divided by lagged book value of equity INV total investment, defined as the change in total assets over the previous fiscal year, scaled by lagged total assets Debt / MV Assets market leverage, calculated as total debt divided by the market value of assets (total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity) PPE / Assets net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets Intangibles / Assets the total intangibles on the balance sheet scaled by total assets R&D / Assets research and development expense scaled by lagged total assets Advertising / Assets advertising expense scaled by lagged total assets Pretax Loss (0,1) an indicator variable equal to 1 when EBT is less than zero Foreign Income (0,1) an indicator variable equal to one when the firm reports foreign pretax earnings UTB Reserve / Assets the reserve for uncertain tax benefits σ(Ret) the standard deviation of stock returns estimated over the 60 month period ending in December of the calendar year in which the fiscal year ends Lag (Ret) twelve-month return for a period ending one month before the fiscal year end Tax Lobby tax lobby intensity, measured as the number of firms in the industry involved in tax lobbying from Brown, Drake, and Wellman (2015) scaled by the total number of firms in the industry Table 3 -Returns on portfolios sorted on tax planning
Panel A reports average excess returns and alphas (intercepts) from the time-series regressions of excess returns on risk factors for quintile portfolios of stocks sorted by the effective tax rate. The alphas are from the three-factor (market, size, and book-to-market), four-factor (market, size, book-to-market, and momentum) and five-factor (market, size, book-to-market, profitability, and investment) models. The portfolio returns are equal-weighted. The last column reports excess returns and alphas on a hedge portfolio that is long (short) in the Low Tax (High Tax) stocks. Returns are in monthly percentage points. t-statistics are reported in brackets. Panel B reports summary statistics for the tax planning portfolios, including the average number of stocks, decile of NYSE and AMEX market capitalization, and beginning of the month stock price for the stocks in each portfolio. The portfolio statistics also include Sharpe ratio (SR) estimated as average monthly portfolio return over the standard deviation of portfolio returns, the standard deviation of portfolio returns (σ) and factor loadings from the four-factor (βMkt, βSMB, βHML, βUMD) and five-factor (βCMA, βRMW) models. Table 6 using alternative tax planning measures. ETR is the median three-year GAAP effective tax rate in the firm's industry. - [Book -tax] is the negative of industry-median book-tax difference. ETR × Characteristic terms denote interactions between ETR and various characteristics. -[Book -tax] × Characteristic terms denote interactions between bookto-tax differences and various characteristics. All regressions include a full set of controls, with coefficients on control variables omitted for brevity. Column (1) contains coefficients averaged over the full sample period. Columns (2) and (3) split the period on the political party of the President in office. Columns (4) and (5) split the period on whether the proportion of Democratic administration appointees among the U.S. Tax Court judges is high or low. t-statistics for the time-series of monthly coefficients are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Firm-level cash tax rate is the sum of cash taxes paid over three years divided by the sum of pretax income before special items. Industry-level cash tax rate is the industry median firm-level cash tax rate. Industries follow the FamaFrench 48 industry classification. Changes in profitability are measured by changes in ROA and E/P ratios relative to the year in which tax rates are measured (year t). ROA is a ratio of income before extraordinary items to lagged total assets. E/P is a ratio of income before extraordinary items to lagged market value of equity. Panel A contains univariate comparisons in future profitability changes across quintile cash tax rate portfolios. The reported values are time-series averages of yearly portfolio means. The last column contains the average difference between the lowest and highest quintiles, where statistical significance is based on standard errors after the Newey-West [1987] adjustment for autocorrelation. Panel B reports the results of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions with future 3-year ROA and E/P changes added as control variables. Across all regressions, the sample is restricted to observations with non-missing firm-level cash tax rate measures. All other variables are as defined in Appendix. * , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A. GAAP ETR
